This week’s newsletter announces the newest version of LND, briefly
describes a tool for generating bitcoin ownership proofs, and links to an
Optech study about the usability of Replace-by-Fee. Also included are
summaries of notable code changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure
Upgrade to LND 0.5.2: this minor-version release
fixes bugs related to stability and improves compatibility with other
RBF usability study published: with only about 6% of the
transactions confirmed in 2018 signaling support for BIP125 opt-in
Replace-by-Fee (RBF), Optech contributor Mike Schmidt undertook an
examination of almost two dozen popular Bitcoin wallets,
block explorers, and other services to see how they handled either
sending or receiving RBF transactions (including fee bumps). His
report provides visual examples, both good and bad, of how many systems handle RBF
transactions. The examples of problems are not made to criticize the pioneering developers of
those systems, but to help all Bitcoin developers learn how to master
the powerful fee-management capability that RBF provides.
Based on the examples collected, the report
concludes with a summary of recommendations for developers.
Tool released for generating and verifying bitcoin ownership
proofs: Blockstream has released a tool that
helps bitcoin custodians, such as exchanges, prove that they control a
certain number of bitcoins without creating an onchain transaction.
The tool works by creating an almost-valid transaction that contains
all of the same information a valid transaction would
contain—proving that the transaction creator had access to all of
the information necessary to create a spend (e.g. the private keys).
The tool is written in the Rust programming language and uses the
increasingly popular BIP174 Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction
(PSBT) format for interoperability with Bitcoin Core and other Bitcoin
tools. Future plans for the tool include privacy enhancements.
Bitcoin Core #14897 introduces a semi-random order biased towards
outbound connections when requesting transactions, making it harder
for attackers to abuse one of Bitcoin Core’s bandwidth-reduction
measures. Previously, when your node received an announcement of a
new transaction from one of its peers, it requested that transaction
from that peer. While it waited for the transaction to be sent, it
might have received announcements of the same transaction from its
other peers. If the first peer hadn’t sent the transaction within two
minutes, your node would then request the transaction from the second
peer who announced it, again waiting two minutes before requesting it
from the next peer. This allowed an attacker who opens a large number
of connections to your node to potentially delay your receipt of a
transaction by a large number of two-minute intervals.
If such an attack was performed across the whole network, it might
be able to prevent certain transactions from reaching miners,
possibly breaking the security of protocols that rely on timely
confirmation (e.g. LN payment channels). A network-wide attack
could also make it easier to map the network
and redirect transaction traffic in order to learn which IP address
originated a transaction.
With this PR, your node will only immediately request the
transaction from the first peer that announced it if your node
initially chose to open a connection to that peer (i.e. an outbound
peer). If you first heard about the transaction from a peer that
connected to you (an inbound peer), you’ll wait two seconds before
requesting the transaction to give an outbound peer a chance to tell
you about it first. If the first peer you request the transaction
from has not sent it to you within a minute, you’ll request it from
another randomly-selected peer. If that also doesn’t work, you’ll
continue to randomly select peers to request the transaction from.
This doesn’t eliminate the problem, but it does mean that
an attacker who wants to delay a transaction probably needs to
operate a much larger number of nodes to achieve the same delay.
It’s possible that a set reconciliation technique based on something
like libminisketch could provide a complete solution for any
node with at least one honest peer.
Bitcoin Core #14491 allows the importmulti RPC to import keys
specified using an output script descriptor. Keys imported this way will be converted to the current
wallet datastructure, but the eventual plan is for Bitcoin Core’s
wallet to use descriptors internally.
Bitcoin Core #14667 adds a new deriveaddress RPC that takes a
descriptor containing a key path plus an extended public key and
returns the corresponding address.
Bitcoin Core #15226 adds a blank parameter to the createwallet
RPC that allows creating a wallet without an HD seed or any private
keys. The wallet can then have private or public key material added
to it (e.g. an HD seed using sethdseed or a watching-only address
using importaddress). The wallet can also be encrypted while still
blank using the encryptwallet RPC. The term “blank” is used to
distinguish a wallet without keys from an “empty” wallet whose keys
don’t control any bitcoins.
LND #2457 adds a cancelinvoice RPC to cancel an invoice that
hasn’t been settled yet. If a payment for a canceled invoice arrives
at your node, it’ll return the same error it would’ve used if that
invoice never existed, preventing the payment from succeeding and
returning all money to the spender.
LND #2572 adds an outgoing_chan_id parameter to the sendpayment
command. You can use this parameter to specify which of your channels
should be used for the first hop of the payment.
Eclair #736 adds support for both connecting to Tor hidden
services (.onion) and operating as a hidden service.
Documentation is provided for users.